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21.
In this work we examine how economic growth affects public debt when interacted with reelection prospects. Reelection considerations shorten political time horizons and give rise to political myopia that exacerbates debt accumulation. That laxer institutional reelection restrictions (e.g., no term limits) mitigate this effect due to electoral accountability is well known. Incorporating growth, we find that this mitigation can be reversed because less myopic, and more accountable, incumbents put more emphasis on smoothing the effects of growth across generations. We test these predictions using an annual-based panel of U.S. states over the period 1963–2010. Our identification strategy rests on constitutionally-entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits that provide plausibly exogenous variation in reelection prospects, and aggregate national TFP shocks that are exogenous to individual states. Our estimates indicate that when reelection is possible a one standard deviation positive income shock induces, within the same year, a relative increase of approximately $40 in real per capita public debt. 相似文献
22.
Entry in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly is excessive if and only if there is business-stealing (Amir et al., 2014). The excessive entry prediction has been derived primarily for closed economies and using a welfarist benchmark. We extend this framework and allow for (1) horizontal FDI in a multi-period setting and (2) interest group-based government behaviour. Opening the market to greenfield investments from abroad tends to aggravate the entry distortion. Moreover, market opening may reduce welfare if a more pronounced entry distortion dominates the gain in consumer surplus. Finally, a government, which places sufficiently little weight on the interests of consumers, will object to market opening, even if welfare rises. 相似文献
23.
Do people “vote with their feet” in response to a lack of political competition? Since political competition is associated with higher growth and welfare, with the free movement of labour, we argue that it should also encourage inward migration. We test this hypothesis by using data from the US and find a strong positive relation between political competition and net migration. This result is robust to alternative specifications, alternative samples and addressing endogeneity using the Voting Rights Act to instrument for political competition. The effect is economically large, specifically, we find that an increase in political competition in the order of magnitude observed in US Southern states during the post-war period leads to an increase in net migration by between 27 and 44 individuals per 1000 population. 相似文献
24.
《Journal of World Business》2020,55(2):101044
This paper contributes to the IB literature by investigating MNEs’ risk mitigation strategies in emerging markets. Drawing on institutional perspectives and March’s theoretical concept of forming a ‘political coalition’, we propose that risk mitigation cannot be limited to passive compliance and/or demonstrating good corporate behavior, but should extend to collective efforts by building a political coalition and working with key stakeholders to manage potential risk and obtain favorable outcomes in complex institutional environments. In considering MNEs in contemporary China and India, we offer different types of risk mitigation strategies under various institutional contexts and a framework for future research. 相似文献
25.
Large-scale land deals have attracted considerable attention for various reasons, including their implications for local livelihoods. While some view the phenomena as a development opportunity, encompassing improvement in the livelihoods of local people, others argue that it is an impoverishing scheme. Ethiopia ranks among the top in terms of the size of land leased out over the last decade. Land is a major resource of state control and investment in Ethiopia. As the foundation of their livelihoods and identity, it is simultaneously a vital resource for the local people. Highlighting the importance of land for local livelihoods and state-society relations and employing a political-ecological approach, this paper analyzes the outcomes of two land lease cases for the local people in Bakko Tibbe district of Oromia, Ethiopia. The findings show that the land leases induced a significant decline in local people’s access to land, resulting in a significant reduction in crop production and livestock husbandry. The land leases also dismantled longstanding land-based social relations in both production systems. Based on empirical evidence from specific localities and contextualizing the local livelihood dynamics within broader political-economic conditions, this study contributes to the ongoing debate on livelihood impacts of global land deals. 相似文献
26.
A political leadership transition occurs in China every five years. This shift in leadership is accompanied by tremendous uncertainty within Chinese society, particularly for the nation's wealthy people. Examining private residential property transaction data in Singapore, this paper reveals that the number of transactions by Chinese mainland buyers increases by half during political transitions that occurred between 1998 and 2013, in comparison to buyers from Malaysia, the US, and Hong Kong. 相似文献
27.
ABSTRACT We examine the impact of political uncertainty on the labour investment efficiency (LIE) of a firm. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we test the market discipline and managerial entrenchment hypotheses. Our findings suggest that political uncertainty adversely affects LIE. The results are consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. That is, firms hire more labour in a period of increased information asymmetry due to the political uncertainty, which deteriorates LIE. Our findings are robust to a battery of alternative measures of LIE and estimation methods. We conduct several additional analyses and document that the adverse impact of political uncertainty is stronger when the newly appointed government official is older, the firm is state-owned, the firm belongs to a politically sensitive industry or the firm operates in locations with stringent labour protection. By contrast, when the firm locates in a region with weak Chinese government intervention or after President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, the adverse impact of political uncertainty on LIE is less pronounced. Last, we document that after hiring more labour, firms receive tangible and intangible benefits in terms of receiving more loans, collect more government subsidies, and able to re-establish some political connection but at the cost of lower performance. 相似文献
28.
《Socio》2020
This paper models a resource allocation problem in the political context. Voters and political candidates of two parties are positioned in each of n given electoral districts. We assume that each voter will vote for the candidate he is more attracted to. This attraction is modeled by an attraction function. Each of the parties now attempts to allocate a finite budget to maximize their objective, which is either the popular vote or the number of districts, in which the party has a majority. Individual scenarios are examined with respect to leader-follower solutions and Nash equilibria. The paper then describes a dynamic model that successively allocates existing funds plus additional donations to candidates in different electoral districts. 相似文献
29.
Anders Åslund 《Economics of Transition》2018,26(4):851-862
The dominant idea in the early post-communist economic transition was that an early and comprehensive radical economic reform programme was needed. This program was accompanied by a clear programme of political economy reform, which included; a clear understanding that the old system was finished, a political breakthrough, new political leaders, new economic policymakers, the swift elaboration of a reform programme, a functioning parliament, sufficient international financial support, fast implementation, public understanding, and the overruling of any need for consensus. In hindsight, all of these factors worked when they were present. Critics warned of too sharp an output fall, which did not come to pass, lagging institutional development, and neglect of social reforms. The biggest problem has become the absence of real property rights because of captured judicial systems in the post-communist countries not belonging to the European Union. 相似文献
30.
This paper examines how bureaucracy affects political accountability and electoral selection, using a three-tier political agency model consisting of voters, politicians and bureaucrats. In the model’s hierarchy, politicians are constrained by elections while bureaucrats are controlled by budgets. If voters and bureaucrats prefer different types of politicians (i.e. they have a conflict of interests), incumbents pass oversized budgets to prevent bureaucrats from engaging in strategic behaviours that damage incumbents’ reputations. If, instead, voters and bureaucrats prefer the same type of politicians (i.e. they have an alignment of interests), bureaucrats cannot obtain a concession from politicians. In the latter case, however, bureaucrats send voters a credible signal regarding an incumbent’s type, which improves electoral selection. This paper also shows that political appointment systems improve political accountability in the conflict-of-interests case while they weaken electoral selection in the alignment-of-interests case. 相似文献